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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EXCLUSIONARY RULE - EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM DEFENDANT DURING PERIOD OF
UNNECESSARY DELAY IN PRESENTING HIM BEFORE A
JUDICIAL OFFICER SUBJECT TO EXCLUSION UNDER M.D.R.
723(a). JOHNSON v. STATE, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Johnson v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in a
4-3 decision that failure to comply with Maryland District Rule
723(a), 2 which requires prompt arraignment of a criminal defendant
after his arrest, will result in the exclusion of all statements made by
the defendant during the period of impermissible delay 3 and those4
made subsequent thereto which are tainted by breach of the rule.
Prior to Johnson, Maryland had espoused the traditional test of
voluntariness with regard to the admission of confessions and
statements made during a delay in presentment of a defendant. In
abandoning this less severe test, the court of appeals aligned
Maryland with a small minority of states 5 which have adopted a
position similar to the McNabb-Mallory Rule,6 a rule once applicable
in federal prosecutions, but which has since been modified by
Congress.7 This Note discusses the exclusionary rule adopted by the
Johnson court, examines the differences between the majority and
dissenting opinions, and explores the portent of the Johnson
decision for future criminal procedure adjudication.

1. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
2. See text accompanying notes 13-14 infra.
3. Id. at 328-29, 384 A.2d at 717. Judge Levine delivered the opinion of the court.
Chief Judge Murphy filed a dissenting opinion with which Judges Smith and
Orth concurred. Id. at 342-51, 384 A.2d at 724-29. Judge Orth also filed a
dissenting opinion with which Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Smith concurred.
Id. at 333-42, 384 A.2d at 719-24.
4. Id. at 329, 384 A.2d at 717.
5. Delaware, Florida, Montana, and Pennsylvania have abandoned use of the
voluntariness standard to determine admissibility of statements obtained during
a pre-arraignment delay. E.g., Webster v. State, 59 Del. 54, 213 A.2d 298 (1965);
Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del. 35, 212 A.2d 886 (1965); Oliver v. State, 250 So. 2d 888,
889 (Fla. 1971); State v. Bentos, 570 P.2d 894, 900 (Mont. 1977); Commonwealth v.
Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa.
444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973); Common wealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701
(1973); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
6. The McNabb-Mallory rule is derived from the Supreme Court decisions in
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410 (1948), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). See text
accompanying notes 32-67 infra.
7. The McNabb-Mallory rule was modified by Congress with the passage of 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1976). For a full discussion of the modification, see text
accompanying notes 61-67 infra.
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II. THE FACTS
The events culminating in the Johnson decision began on
January 13, 1975, when a man matching defendant Johnson's
description committed a robbery. Subsequently, on January 24, 1975,
Johnson allegedly was involved in a second robbery. Warrants for
Johnson's arrest were obtairned by the police on January 25, 1975.8
He voluntarily surrendered to the police at 3:15 p.m. on January 30,
1975, and was immediately taken into custody, processed, and
informed that he was under arrest. At approximately 3:20 p.m. he
was given Miranda9 warnings, but he nonetheless waived his right
to remain silent and to have the advice of counsel. Johnson was then
taken to an interrogation room where, as soon as the questioning
began, he complained of stomach pains. The interrogation was
immediately halted and the police offered to take Johnson to the
hospital. Johnson declined this offer, but asked for permission to
rest. He was then taken to a cell where he remained for the rest of
that day and night.
The following morning, Johnson's condition seemed to have
improved, and interrogation was resumed at 9:45 a.m. Johnson was
given a second set of Miranda warnings, and again he waived his
rights. The interrogation resulted in a ten page statement which
Johnson signed at 3:45 p.m. In this statement Johnson incriminated
himself in the first robbery of January 13, 1975.
At 4:00 p.m. on January 31st Johnson was taken before a
commissioner for the first time, having been in police custody for
over 24 hours. 10 After his appearance before the commissioner,
Johnson was read his Miranda warnings for a third and final time.
He again waived his rights and at 6:55 p.m. confessed outright to
both the January 13th and January 24th crimes.
At a pretrial hearing Johnson sought to have the January 31st
statements suppressed on the ground that the confessions were

8. No arrest warrants were served on Johnson. He was, however, orally informed
that he was under arrest. This constituted a possible violation of former M.D.R.
706(d), which requires an arresting officer to give an accused a copy of the arrest
warrant "promptly after his arrest." The court of appeals, however, did not
decide this issue. See Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 319 n.3, 384 A.2d 709, 712 n.3
(1978).
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. At the trial, a police officer was asked why Johnson, after his arrest, had not
been promptly presented before a commissioner. He replied:
A. Because he hadn't been interrogated then, sir, and we were still
investigating the case.
Q. In other words you wanted to keep him at the Annapolis Police
Department, in a detention cell there, until you had such time and
opportunity to interrogate him, is that correct?
A. And not only that, Anne Arundel County Detention Center will
not admit or take anybody that is sick.
Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 318, 384 A.2d 709, 711-12 (1978).
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inadmissible due to the delay in presenting him before a judicial
officer, in violation of M.D.R. 723(a). 11 The trial court rejected this
contention, admitted the statements, and Johnson was subsequently
12
convicted. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE
The central inquiries presented to the Johnson court were the
13
construction and remedy, if any, for a violation of M.D.R. 723(a),
which provides that:
A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall
be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay
and in no event later than the earlier of 1) 24 hours after
arrest or 2) the first session of court after 'the defendant's
arrest upon a warrant or, where an arrest has been made
without a warrant, the first session of court after the
shall be
charging document is filed. A charging document
14
filed lromptly after arrest if not already filed.
The purposes of the Maryland prompt presentment statute are
twofold: it assures a defendant, that once taken into custody, he will
receive impartial judicial supervision of his rights at the earliest
possible stage of detention, 15 and prevents secret interrogation of the

11. Johnson also argued that the statements were inadmissible because the
confessions were tainted by the illegal delay in presenting Johnson before a
judicial officer and were therefore inadmissible on the basis of Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975), which held that giving a Miranda warning does not alone
purge the taint from a statement given after an illegal arrest. Johnson v. State,
282 Md. 314, 319, 384 A.2d 709, 712 (1978). The Court of Appeals of Maryland did
not rule on these arguments, as it decided the case on M.D.R. 709(a). Id. at 319
n.3, 384 A.2d at 712 n.3.
12. 36 Md. App. 162, 373 A.2d 300 (1977).
13. The Court of Appeals of Maryland was actually confronted with a violation of
M.D.R. 709(a). Since the time of Johnson's conviction, however, Chapter 700 of
the Maryland District Rules has undergone extensive revision. M.D.R. 709(a) was
changed to M.D.R. 723(a), but with only slight modifications. Therefore, for the
sake of clarity, the court of appeals made references to M.D.R. 723(a), rather than
M.D.R. 709(a), throughout the opinion. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 316 n.1,
384 A.2d 709, 710, n.1 (1978).
M.D.R. 709(a) provided:
A defendant shall be taken before a conveniently available judicial
officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier
of (1) twenty-four hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after
the charging of the defendant. Such charging shall take place promptly
after arrest.
14. M.D.R. 723(a).
15. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 323, 384 A.2d 709, 714 (1978). It should be noted
that M.D.R. 723(a) requires adherence to the provisions of M.D.R. 723(b). M.D.R.
723(b) provides that a judicial officer shall (1) inform the defendant of the offense
with which he is charged; (2) advise the defendant of his right to counsel; (3)
determine the defendant's eligibility for pretrial release pursuant to M.D.R. 721;
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defendant by the police after his arrest. In essence, the rule assures
that a judicial officer, not merely the police, will advise an arrested
person of his constitutional rights. 16 Thus, underlying the rule is the
assumption that police warnings given to a suspect after arrest are
inadequate safeguards of his rights because "such warnings may
well be7 meaningless in the coercive milieu of secret police interroga1
tion.1
The prompt presentment requirement is not, however, a mere
statutory rule of criminal procedure because, although not itself a
constitutional right, it is the means by which the state implements
procedures that guarantee an accused those rights. One of the most
important functions of prompt presentment, for example, is to
provide an immediate determination of probable cause.18 Furthermore, prompt presentment assures that the time spent in custody by
an individual "unreasonably seized" is kept to a minimum, in
accordance with the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable seizures. 19 In addition, one of the salutory effects of prompt
presentment is to curtail the incidence of "round-up" or "dragnet"
arrests. 2° By having an arrested person brought promptly before a
magistrate, there will be a natural reluctance by the police to charge

16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

(4) make a determination of probable cause; (5) advise the defendant that he has
the right to request a preliminary hearing, if the defendant is charged with a
felony that is not within the jurisdiction of the court; and (6) advise the
defendant of the date for trial or inform the defendant that he will be advised by
clerk as to the date of the trial.
Alston v. United States, 348 F.2d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Greenwell v. United
States, 336 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1964)), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 923 (1965).
Id.
The fourth amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975), requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to any extended restraint on liberty. M.D.R. 723(b)(4) requires that a
defendant be released if a judicial officer finds that the defendant was arrested
without probable cause.
In Maryland, prompt presentment also ensures that a defendant will receive
a prompt bail determination pursuant to M.D.R. 723(b), even though the
"excessive bail" portion of the eighth amendment has not yet been deemed
applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
But see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the
Supreme Court held that illegally seized evidence was inadmissible in a federal
trial. The Court applied the exclusionary rule to illegally seized evidence to state
proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
GEO. L. J. 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HOGAN].
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in effect,
numerous individuals with the same crime. 21 The rule,
"acts as a barrier to abuses of the criminal process. ' 22
Prompt presentment also serves a second function in that it
safeguards the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination 23 and the due process right to be free from coercive
investigative methods. 24 By precluding secret detention the rule
diminishes the opportunity for the police to use illegal tactics when
interrogating the accused.
Critics of the prompt presentment requirement point out that if
the police use coercive tactics, the evidence or confession obtained
will be excluded even absent the rule. 25 It is not easy, however, for a
defendant to prove that force, especially psychological coercion, was
used against him. Certainly the police officer who is willing to use
can readily aver that he did not use coercive
such methods
26
pressure.

21. Id. at 23. 'The police would look rather ridiculous parading a regiment of
arrestees before a committing magistrate and endeavoring to convince him that
there is probable cause to link them all with a crime admittedly committed by
one or two." Id.
22. Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 248, 301 A.2d 701, 704 (1973) (Eagen, J.,
concurring).
23. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states that a defendant
shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal
proceeding. The privilege against self-incrimination was held applicable to the
states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
24. Section four of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
states that "[n]o State shall .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.
" U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. See also Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (voluntariness is a requirement for any
confession in a state proceeding, under the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
25. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963). Even if such a confession is excluded, however, the exclusion has done
nothing to bar the use of the coercion, as it has already taken place. HOGAN,
supra note 20, at 26-27.
26. HOGAN, supra note 20, at 27. Mr. Justice Frankfurter summed up the rationale
for the rule in McNabb v. United States as follows:
The purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal
procedure is plain. ... The lawful instruments of the criminal law
cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of
criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for
which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication. Legislation such as this, requiring
that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for
detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard - not
only in assuring protection for the innocent, but also in securing
conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a
progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement
checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the 'third degree'
which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way
into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation
of persons accused of crime.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943).
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Finally, prompt presentment ensures that a defendant is
apprised of his constitutional right to counsel 27 by a neutral judicial
officer, not merely the police. It has been argued that prompt
presentment is not needed if the police advise a suspect of his right
to counsel during the initial Miranda warnings. 28 Such a police
warning, however, is not a substitute for prompt presentment
29
because the police lack the impartiality of a neutral judicial officer.
In summary, prompt presentment represents more than a mere
statutory proscription. It is a legislative vehicle designed to protect

fundamental constitutional rights. Consequently, prompt presentment acquires a quasi-constitutionalbasis.m0
IV. THE McNABB-MALLORY RULE
The exclusionary rule adopted in Johnson is similar to that
31
fashioned by the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States,
Upshaw v. United States,32 and Mallory v. United States.33 A
discussion of these federal decisions, therefore, is appropriate for a
full understanding of the Maryland decision.
The McNabb-Mallory rule required

the exclusion 34 of any

35
incriminating statement or confession, voluntary or otherwise,

27. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution grants a defendant the
right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. In Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that the sixth amendment right to
counsel was applicable in state court proceedings. The Court also stated that
counsel must be appointed to represent an indigent defendant. Id. at 339-45. In
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court ruled that a defendant in
custody must be advised of his right to counsel prior to being questioned.
28. O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131, 136-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827
(1969).
29. The Supreme Court, in its Mirandaopinion, indicated that a police warning will
not supplant prompt arraignment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 n.32
(1966).
30. Cf. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968) (Douglas, J. &
Warren, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the common law right to resist
unlawful arrest has a quasi-constitutional basis because it is a means by which
the fourth amendment is protected). At least one scholar has suggested that the
right to prompt presentment is of a constitutional nature. See MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 340-41 (2d ed. 1972).
31. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
32. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
33. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
34. In deciding that inculpatory statements or confessions obtained during
"unnecessary delay" and thus illegal detention, were inadmissible, the Court
fashioned a per se exclusionary rule. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413

(1948).

35. In Upshaw the Court stated that "a confession is inadmissible if made during
illegal detention due to failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing
magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is the result of torture, physical or
psychological.... ' " Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (quoting
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944)). Thus, the Court abolished
voluntariness as the standard for admitting a confession obtained during illegal
detention. See also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
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obtained from a defendant during a period of illegal detention. 36
Illegal detention, in the McNabb-Mallory context, was the period of
time that constituted an "unnecessary delay" in presenting a
defendant before a magistrate.
The McNabb-Mallory rule found its genesis in the case of
McNabb v. United States. 37 Five members of the McNabb clan were
arrested for the murder of a federal revenue agent. 38 The McNabbs,
who were poorly educated Tennessee mountaineers, were held for
two days during which intensive interrogation of each defendant
was conducted. The confessions obtained by the police were held
39
inadmissible by the Supreme Court, not on constitutional grounds,
but because of the violation of federal policy embodied in the federal
statute requiring prompt arraignment. 40 The aftermath of McNabb,
however, was judicial confusion, as some lower federal courts limited
41
the exclusionary rule fashioned in McNabb to its facts.
Two years after McNabb the Supreme Court refined the holding
of McNabb in Mitchell v. United States.42 In Mitchell, the defendant
confessed shortly after arrest, but was held for eight days before
being arraigned. The Court held that his confession was admissible
because the "illegality of Mitchell's detention [did] not retroactively
' '43
change the circumstances under which he made the disclosures.
Some courts interpreted Mitchell to mean that the delay must have
induced the confession and that a confession not causally related to
an unnecessary delay was admissible. 44 In essence, the decisions
applied the exclusionary rule only when the delay had been
45
accompanied by aggravating circumstances such as in McNabb.

36. "In effect it means, and can only mean, that given the concurrence of unlawful
detention and a confession, the former contaminates the latter." HOGAN, supra
note 20, at 11.
37. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
38. Only three members of the McNabb family, two brothers and a cousin, actually
petitioned the Supreme Court. Two of the other McNabbs charged with murder
were acquitted by the trial court.
39. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). The petitioners had urged
that the Court rule the confessions inadmissible under the fifth amendment. Id.
at 339.
40. Id. at 345. The statute violated in McNabb was 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1934). Rule 5(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had not been promulgated at the time of
McNabb.
41. HOGAN, supra note 20, at 5. In analyzing the McNabb decision, Hogan and Snee
correctly point out that Justice Frankfurter contributed to the confusion
surrounding the McNabb decision. The McNabb opinion is replete with phrases
such as the "circumstances disclosed here," McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 341 (1943), and the "circumstances in which the statements admitted in
evidence against the petitioners were secured." Id.; HOGAN, supra note 20, at 4-5.
42. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
43. Id. at 70.
44. Alderman v. United States, 165 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
45. This position is difficult to reconcile with McNabb because the Court declined to
decide McNabb on the basis of a possible fifth amendment violation. McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
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The Supreme Court purported to settle the meaning of unnecessary delay in Upshaw v. United States46 and Mallory v. United
States.4 7 In Upshaw, the Court ruled that any prearraignment
detention for the purpose of obtaining a confession constituted an
"unnecessary delay" under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 48 In Mallory, the Court stated that the duty to
arraign "without unnecessary delay," did not call for "mechanical or
automatic obedience. '49 There could be brief delays for example, to
verify the story or alibi of an accused through third parties. The
delay in presentment, however, could not be for the purpose of
extracting a confession. 50 This was the crux of the McNabb-Mallory
rule. It was not the span of hours that was critical, but what
happened during the delay. So long as the delay was not for the
purpose of extracting a confession, it was not considered unnecessary. 5 1
The Court's rationale for the McNabb-Mallory rule was based, in
part, on the recognition that one of the purposes of Federal Rule
5(a)5 2 was to avoid secret interrogations of a defendant.5 3 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that admitting evidence that was the
product of an illegal detention would frustrate the very purpose of
the rule. In addition, although Congress had never explicitly defined
the remedy for failure to comply with prompt presentment, the
Supreme Court justified application of an exclusionary rule by
reasoning that admission of evidence obtained by delay would not
only "stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law," 54 but
would also make the judiciary an accomplice to illegal behavior. 55 A
final point in the Court's rationale for the McNabb-Mallory rule
further illuminates its underlying policy considerations. The Court

46. 355 U.S. 410 (1948).
47. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
48. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948).
49. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). The rule provides that:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate or, in the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably
available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C.

§ 3041. If a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a
magistrate, a complaint shall be filed forthwith which shall comply with

the requirements of Rule 4(a) with respect to the showing of probable
cause. When a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a
summons, appears initially before the magistrate, the magistrate shall
proceed in accordance with the applicable subdivisions of this rule.

53. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943).
54. Id. at 345.
55. Id.
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never intended the rule to be a penalty for police misconduct.5 6 It
of enforcing a
merely reasoned that the rule was the best method
57
Congressional mandate for prompt presentment.
The Supreme Court did not decide McNabb, Upshaw, or Mallory
on constitutional grounds,5 8 but rather on the Court's supervisory
authority over "the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts."5' 9 Consequently, the McNabb-Mallory rule was held not to be
binding on the states. 6°
The McNabb-Mallory rule was modified legislatively in 1968
when Congress passed Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act. Passage of Title II, now codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501,61 which sets forth the criteria to be used in determining
whether a confession obtained after a delay in presentment is
admissible, 62 marks the return of the federal courts to the voluntari56. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 421 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944)).
57. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
58. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 n.2 (1948); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). The Court did not comment on the issue of
constitutionality in Mallory.
59. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
60. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-02 (1961). See Fayne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560, 567 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,194 n.2 (1957). Although the
arguments for applying the exclusionary rule to statements obtained during prearraignment delay have often been advanced to state courts, most have rejected
the rule. See e.g., People v. Carbonaro, 21 N.Y.2d 271, 234 N.E.2d 433, 287
N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967); Rogers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 46 Cal. 2d 3,
291 P.2d 929 (1955); and cases cited in Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1976) states in pertinent part:
In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant
therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the
custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall
not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such persons
before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons
charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the
District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have
been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left
to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person
within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention:
Provided,That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not
apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such
magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the
trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and
the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or
other officer.
62. It should be noted that the McNabb-Mallory rule is a rule of evidence. It only
comes into existence when a rule of procedure, Rule 5(a), is violated. Thus, 18
U.S.C. § 3501 is a rule of evidence that must be read together with Rule 5(a). See
United States v. Gaines, 555 F.2d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States
v. Davis, 532 F.2d 22, 25 (7th Cir. 1976)). Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure still prohibits an unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant
before a magistrate. It seems, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 has removed the
sanctions for failure to obey Rule 5(a) and has made delay another factor in
determining voluntariness. 18 U.S.C. 3510(b) (1976).
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ness test 63 as a remedy for a violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal
64

Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Admissibility under the voluntariness test is determined by
weighing all facts and circumstances at the time a statement is
made. 65 If not coerced, the statement is admissible notwithstanding
a violation of a statutory rule of presentment.6 6 Under this test,
delay is but one factor to be weighed in determining voluntariness.
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
This standard was abandoned
67
in Johnson v. State.
V. THE JOHNSON DECISION
The Johnson court faced three questions: (1) was there a
violation of M.D.R. 723(a)?; (2) given a violation, what remedy
should be applied?; and (3) did Johnson, by waiving his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona,68 also waive his right to be
brought promptly before a judicial officer?
A. The Violation of 723(a)
In arguing that there had been no violation of the statute, the
state followed the reasoning of the court of special appeals. That
court held that M.D.R. 723(a) was not mandatory, but merely
directory. 69 Because prompt presentment was not mandatory, the

63 The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 indicates that Congress desired to
modify the McNabb-Mallory rule. See S. REP. No. 1907, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2123-27. See also United States
v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970) (for a good discussion of the legislative
history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501); Comment, Admissibility of Confessions Obtained
Between Arrest and Arraignment: Federal and Pennsylvania Approaches, 79
DICK. L. REv. 309, 330-41 (1975); Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 378 (1972).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 555 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976); United
States v. Davis, 532 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976); Government of Virgin Islands v.
Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United
States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972); United
States v. Hathorn, 451 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Marrero, 450
F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972); United States v. Halbert,
436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
65. See 18 U.S.C. §3501(b) (1976).
66. See Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 209 A.2d 595 (1965).
67. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). The leading case in Maryland on the
voluntariness test was Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 209 A.2d 595 (1965). There
are many Maryland cases that discuss violations of prompt arraignment in the
context of a voluntariness issue. See Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d 226
(1963); White v. State, 201 Md. 489, 94 A.2d 447 (1953); Edwards v. State, 194 Md.
387, 71 A.2d 487 (1950); Grear v. State, 194 Md. 335, 71 A.2d 24 (1950); James v.
State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 (1949); Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 64 A.2d 732
(1949). These cases were overruled sub silento by the Johnson decision to the
extent they held that pre-arraignment delay was not itself grounds for excluding
a confession given during such delay.
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69. Johnson v. State, 36 Md. App. 162, 172, 373 A.2d 300, 305 (1977).
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court of special appeals reasoned that there should be no sanction
for failing to comply with the rule. The court of appeals, however,
rejected this argument.7 0 Focusing upon the portion of the statute
requiring that the "defendant shall be taken ...

without unneces-

sary delay," the court concluded that the word shall is presumed to
have a mandatory meaning,7 1 and "thus denotes an imperative
72
obligation inconsistent with the exercise of discretion."
In deciding that shall had a mandatory meaning, the court of
73
appeals did not rely exclusively upon statutory construction. It
stated that prompt presentment must be mandatory in order to
safeguard a defendant's constitutional rights. Additionally, the court
of appeals noted that prompt presentment had been described as a
sine qua non "in any scheme of civil liberties. ' '7 4 In his dissent,
Judge Orth argued that the majority had incorrectly implied a
constitutional, or at least a quasi-constitutional,basis for prompt
presentment. 75 Both the dissenting and majority opinions agreed,
76
however, that the statute should be construed to be mandatory.
B.

The Proposed Remedies

Having decided that there had been a violation of M.D.R. 723(a),
the court of appeals next addressed the problem of what remedy, if
any, should be applied to the violation. The state advanced three
alternative theories to the court: (1) that the court should keep the

present voluntariness test, 77 (2) if the court adopted an exclusionary

rule, a confession or statement should-only be suppressed "if the
defendant ...

was unfairly prejudiced" 78 and (3) that the exclusion-

ary rule should be applied only where the police had committed a
79

substantial violation of the prompt presentment rule.

70. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 323, 384 A.2d 709, 714 (1978).

71. Id. at 321, 384 A.2d at 713 (citing Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-65, 369 A.2d

1011, 1013 (1977)).
72. Id. (citing Bright v. Unsat. Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169, 338
A.2d 248 (1975)). Since Johnson was decided, the court of special appeals has had
an opportunity to comment on the issue of mandatory versus directory
construction of the word "shall" in statutes. Hopkins v. Md. Inmate Griev.
Comm'n, 40 Md. App. 329, 334-35, 391 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1978).
73. 282 Md. 314, 321, 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978).
74. Id. The court of appeals quoted from Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule:
Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L. J. 1, 27 (1958).
75. 282 Md. 314, 339, 384 A.2d 709, 723 (1978) (Orth, J., dissenting). Judge Orth
asserted that all rules governing prompt presentment are derived from the
court's supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice, and not
from the federal or state constitutions. Id.
76. Id. at 339, 350-51, 384 A.2d at 723, 729 (Orth, J. & Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 325, 384 A.2d at 715.
78. Id. at 327, 384 A.2d at 716.
79. Id.
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The court of appeals refused to retain the voluntariness
standard,1° notwithstanding the wide acceptance of that test.8 1 The
court concluded that it was "a hopelessly inadequate means of
safeguarding a defendant's right of prompt presentment," as it
would in no way prevent a gross violation of prompt presentment, so
long as a defendant had given a pre-initial appearance statement
voluntarily. 2 The dissenters, in contrast, would have adhered to
prior Maryland precedents applying the voluntariness standard to
confessions obtained in violation of the statute. s3
The state's proposal that "a confession or statement [should] be
suppressed, only if the defendant could demonstrate that he was
unfairly prejudiced by reason of police failure to obey the prompt
presentment rule,"8 4 was rejected as being nothing more than a mere
reformulation of the voluntariness test.8 5 Furthermore, the court
reasoned this test would place an almost impossible burden upon the
defendant to prove that the detention was "deliberately prolonged in
order to extract a confession."8 6 The court concluded that "a
defendant suffers prejudice whenever a statement procured during
an illegal delay is used against him at trial or leads
directly to other
87
evidence ultimately employed to convict him.
Under the third proposal advocated by the state, application of
the exclusionary rule would be required only in cases in which the
police had committed substantial violations of the prompt presentment rule.88 This remedy is similar to that proposed by the American
Law Institute in its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 89

80.

The State exhorts us to . . . apply a voluntariness

standard to

statements obtained in violation of M.D.R. 723 a. We decline to do so. To

81.
82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

say that an unlawful postponement of the intial appearance may be
merely a factor in assessing the admissibility of a statement, is to imply
that an unnecessary delay may be overlooked entirely if other indicia of
voluntariness exist. Under this analysis, even a gross violation of the
presentment requirement can be disregarded altogether.
Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 325, 384 A.2d 709, 715 (1978).
Only Pennsylvania, Montana, Florida and Delaware do not use the voluntariness test. See cases cited in note 5 supra.
282 Md. 314, 325, 384 A.2d 709, 715 (1978) (emphasis added).
In his dissent, Judge Orth stated that he was opposed to applying the
exclusionary rule to violations of M.D.R. 723(a). He concluded that if such a
remedy was intended for a violation of the rule, the legislature would have
manifested such an intention. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 335, 384 A.2d 709,
720 (1978) (Orth, J. dissenting).
Id. at 327, 384 A.2d at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 393, 290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972)).
Id. at 327-28, 384 A.2d at 716-17.
ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (1975).
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Under the Model Code, statements would be excluded only if the
violation of prompt presentment was:
(1) gross, wilful and prejudicial to the accused (2) of a kind
likely to lead accused persons to misunderstand the
positions or legal rights and to have influenced the
defendant's decision to make the statement or (3) created a
significant risk that an incriminating statement may have
been untrue. 90
The court's rationale for rejecting the test comports with its
rationale for adopting the exclusionary rule for violations of M.D.R.
723(a). By excluding only substantial violations of the rule, the test
might actually encourage less than substantial violations of the rule.
C. The Johnson Holding
In lieu of the state's proposed theories, the court of appeals
applied a per se exclusionary rule to the violation of Maryland's
prompt presentment statute. 91 The decision was tripartite in nature.
First, the court held that the rule places a maximum limit on
permissible delay, which, when exceeded, will automatically result in
the exclusion of all statements obtained during the delay, regardless
of the reason for the delay. Second, it established a rigorous
compliance standard within the outer "hours" perimeter which if not
complied with, will also result in the exclusion of any statements or
confessions obtained during the delay. Third, the rule requires the
exclusion of statements tainted by the delay. Dicta in the decision
also indicated that a derivative evidence rule will be applied to
exclude evidence
obtained from leads acquired during an impermissi92
ble delay.
The court of appeals interpreted M.D.R. 723(a) to mean that the
earlier of the first session of court or 24 hours after arrest is the

90. Id.
91.
We. .. hold that any statement, voluntary or otherwise, obtained from
an arrestee during a period of unnecessary delay in producing him before
a judicial officer, thereby violating M.D.R. 723 a, is subject to exclusion
when offered into evidence against the defendant as part of the
prosecution's case-in-chief. A statement is automatically excludible if, at
the time it was obtained from the defendant, he had not been produced
before a commissioner for his initial appearance within the earlier of 24
hours after arrest or the first session of court following arrest,
irrespective of the reason for the delay. Where, however, the delay in

presentment falls within the outer limits established by M.D.R. 723 a, it

is incumbent upon the trialcourt to determine whether the State has met
its burden of showing that the delay was necessary under the
circumstances of the particular case.

Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 328, 384 A.2d 709, 717 (1978) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 327, 384 A.2d at 716 (citing Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 393, 290
A.2d 417, 419 (1972)).
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maximum limit of permissible delay. In rendering its opinion, the
court was not very clear as to the exact basis for excluding the
statements made by Johnson. The language of the opinion indicates
that violations of both provisions formed the basis of the decision.
The court declared that the statement was inadmissible "since it was
given during the period of delay in presentment which extended
beyond 24 hours and long after the first session of court following
the arrest." 93 Accordingly, either basis provided sufficient grounds
for excluding the statement.
The facts of the case also indicate that there should be an
exclusion of any statement obtained prior to the 24 hour limit, if the
police hold the defendant beyond 24 hours after arrest. In Johnson,
the police had obtained incriminating oral statements before the 24
hour time period had expired, but waited until slightly over 24 hours
before reducing the statements to writing and obtaining the
defendant's signature. By excluding Johnson's confession, the court
also rejected the oral statements made before 24 hours after arrest
had expired. The prompt presentment rule thus incorporates a
conclusive presumption of illegality, once its limits are exceeded,
94
that relates back to statements obtained anytime during the delay.
The court of special appeals, however, recently rejected this
95
analysis in a case involving rather unusual facts. In Davis v. State
the defendant was taken into custody in Nevada by Maryland police
at 1:30 p.m. on September 3, 1977. He was brought back into
Maryland at 5:30 p.m. on September 4, 1977 on the charges of rape
and robbery. At 8:30 p.m. on September 4th, he confessed to an
unrelated murder. Davis was arraigned at 7:00 p.m. on September 5,
1977, more than 24 hours after he had been placed in the custody of
Maryland police.
The Davis court, in a multi-faceted ruling concerning the
possibility of a violation of M.D.R. 723, began by stating that the
rule has "no extraterritorial effect as a matter of law. ' 96 Where a
defendant has been extradicted from a state into Maryland,
therefore, he is not "detained pursuant to arrest" until returned to

93. Id. at 330, 384 A.2d at 718. Chief Judge Murphy, in his dissent, stated that it was
doubtful that the earlier session of court provision was violated, since the record
did not disclose whether the court was in session. Id. at 347, 384 A.2d at 727
(Murphy, C.J. dissenting).

94. Id. Although not addressed by the court, it seems certain that a delay in violation
of M.D.R. 723(a) will be of no consequence absent a statement obtained during
the delay. In Thereault v. United States, 401 F.2d 79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 933 (1968), the Eighth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention that a

violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure necessitated
reversal of the conviction even where no evidence was obtained during the delay.
See also Morse v. United States, 256 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1958).

95. 42 Md. App. 546, 402 A.2d 77 (1979).
96. Id. at 559. 402 A.2d at 84.
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the territorial limits of Maryland.97 The Davis court asserted,
however, that the defendant had been arrested for robbery and rape,
concluding that Davis was not arrested for the crime of murder until
he completed his confession of that crime at 10:25 p.m. on September
4th. 98 Because Davis was arraigned at 7:00 p.m. on September 5th,
he had not been detained for' more than 24 hours after his "arrest"
for murder, and consequently no violation of M.D.R. 723(a) had
occurred. 99 Alternatively, the court reasoned that even if Davis was
deemed to have been arrested when he arrived in Maryland at 5:30
p.m. on September 4th, the exclusionary rule did not apply because
the confession was given before the 24 hour period after "arrest" had
expired. 1°° Relying upon language from the Johnson opinion,' 0' the
Davis court concluded that a statement is subject to the per se rule of
exclusion only if rendered
after the maximum limits of M.D.R. 723(a)
10 2
have been exceeded.
The Davis opinion represents the lengths to which a court will
travel to avoid the strictures of the Johnson exclusionary rule.
Moreover, its alternative holding that a confession will be excluded
only if given after 24 hours following arrest seems contrary to the
application of M.D.R. 723(a) to the facts of Johnson.In Johnson,the
oral confessions obtained before the expiration of 24 hours following
arrest, were excluded as well as the written confession completed just
after the expiration of the 24 hour period. Finally, the language of

97.
98.
99.
100.
101

Id. at 560, 402 A.2d at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Davis court observed that:
It is true that Davis was not presented to a judicial officer for more than
24 hours after his arrival in Maryland. To that extent M.D.R. 723 a was
violated. But as we read the Johnson exclusionary rule it operates to
automatically exclude a defendant's statement only if, "at the time it
was obtained from the defendant" (Johnson, supra, at 329), the period of
delay in presentment had extended beyond 24 hours after arrest or
beyond the first session of court after arrest, whichever was earlier.
Davis v. State, 42 Md. App. 546, 560, 402 A.2d 77, 85 (1979) (emphasis in
original).
It should be noted that elsewhere in the Johnson opinion the court of appeals
stated that the statements there were excluded "since it was given during the
period of delay in presentment which extended beyond 24 hours . . . following
arrest." Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 330, 384 A.2d 709, 718 (1978). Thus, it was
not clear from Johnson whether the statements would have been excluded only if
obtained after the limits of the rule had been exceeded.
102. The Davis court also considered whether the confession was obtained pursuant
to an unnecessary delay in presentment, a delay not exceeding the maximum
limits of M.D.R. 723(a) that was for purpose of obtaining an confession. See notes
108-111 and accompanying text infra.The court in Davis asserted that it was not
required to make an independent appraisal of this issue and held that the trial
court's conclusion, that no unnecessary delay existed, was not clearly erroneous.
Davis v. State, 42 Md. App. 546, 560-61, 402 A.2d 77, 85 (1979).
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M.D.R. 723(a) states that the accused shall be brought before a
magistrate no later than the aforementioned times following arrest.
Sanctions for clear violations of the rule should not depend upon the
timing of the police in obtaining a confession.
The Johnson court did note an exception to the stringent earlier
of twenty-four hours or first session of court after arrest provisions.
The court of appeals stated that a spontaneous confession or
statement "uttered at the time of arrest or shortly thereafter" would
not be excluded even if the police subsequently violated M.D.R.
723(a). 10 3 In such cases, the rule created by United States v.
Mitchell10 4 will apply.
Chief Judge Murphy, interpreting Mitchell to mean that a
confession was admissible if not induced by the delay, argued in his
dissent that application of the rule of that case should have resulted
in admission of the statements. 10 5 The majority interpretation,
however, comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Mitchell in Mallory.0 6 Under the majority approach, Johnson's
confession could not have been considered admissible. It was not
spontaneous since the police admitted that Johnson was held for
interrogation notwithstanding his illness.107 Nor was the confession
rendered immediately after arrest, but an entire day after his
detention began.
Although the decision of the court of appeals clearly proscribes
the admission into evidence of statements or confessions obtained
during a delay in violation of either the twenty-four hour limit or the
provision regarding the first session of court, it did not define what
would constitute unnecessary delay within the outer perimeter of the
rule. The Johnson court merely stated, "where . . . the delay . . .

falls within the outer limits established by M.D.R. 723 a it is
incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether the State has
met its burden of showing that delay was necessary under the
circumstances of the particular case."10 8
The court of appeals listed five examples of permissible delay:
1) to carry out reasonable routine administrative procedures such as recording, fingerprinting, and photographing;
2) to determine whether a charging document should be
issued accusing the arrestee of a crime; 3) to verify the
commission of the crimes specified in the charging document; 4) to obtain information likely to be a significant aid
in averting harm to persons or loss to property of substan103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 329, 384 A.2d 709, 718 (1978).
322 U.S. 65 (1944).
282 Md. 314, 349-50, 384 A.2d 709, 728 (1978) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
See note 10 supra.
282 Md. 314, 329, 384 A.2d 709, 717 (1978).
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tial value; and 5) to obtain relevant nontestimonial information likely to be significant in discovering the identity ... of

other persons who may have been associated with the
arrestee in the commission of the offense ....109
None of these situations relate to obtaining incriminating testimonial evidence from the accused. It can be inferred, therefore, that the
court of appeals did not intend to allow pre-arraignment delay for
the purpose of interrogation, however brief. This construction of
unnecessary delay is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of unnecessary delay under Rule 5(a). In Mallory, the Supreme
Court stated that brief delays were permitted but that "the delay
must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a
confession."' 10 Carried to its logical conclusion, a delay of even five
minutes, if for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements,
will be impermissible. At least one federal court of appeals so
interpreted the McNabb-Mallory rule."1
The difficulty in applying this facet of the rule is apparent.
Unlike the maximum limits imposed by Rule 723(a), determining
whether a delay was necessary primarily entails scrutinizing the
facts surrounding the delay to determine whether it afforded an
opportunity, seized upon by the police, to interrogate the accused.
This determination necessarily involves an inquiry into police
motives, a speculative endeavor at best. The net result, absent
blatant interrogation, is that courts probably will be reluctant to
suppress any statements but those obtained when the outer limits of
the rule are violated.
Notwithstanding any differences among opinions as to what
constitutes unnecessary delay, the state, when challenged, still has
the burden of proving that the delay was necessary. 1 2 In his dissent,
Chief Judge Murphy intimated that this was an undue burden on the
prosecution. 1 3 When challenged, the prosecution not only will have
to show that a confession was voluntary and that all Miranda
requirements were met, but also it will have to establish that there
was no unnecessary delay in prompt arraignment.
Although it was not stressed as an issue in either of the
dissenting opinions, tainted evidence may also be a problem for the
prosecution in future prompt arraignment challenges. In Johnson
the court not only excluded the statements made before Johnson's
presentment to a judicial officer, but also those made after his

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).
United States v. Alston, 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
282 Md. 314, 329, 384 A.2d 709, 717 (1978).
282 Md. at 350, 384 A.2d at 729 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
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arraignment as well. The court of appeals reasoned that the postarraignment statement was not an "independent act" but, rather,
was tainted by the previous illegal detention. 114 The principle
implicit in this ruling is clear. If there has been an illegal detention,
subsequent presentment to a magistrate will not automatically
dissipate the taint.
The court, in dicta, also appeared to have adopted a derivative
evidence rule. In rejecting the state's second proposed theory for not
employing the exclusionary rule the court stated that "a defendant
suffers prejudice whenever a statement procured during an illegal
delay is used against him at trial or leads directly to other evidence
ultimately employed to convict him." 115 The full import of this
statement will not be known until there is further litigation in this
area. It seems, however, that the court of appeals will exclude not
only confessions and inculpatory statements, but also any evidence
that is derived from the unlawful detention. Thus, a derivative
16
evidence rule such as that applied in Wong Sun v. United States'
may be applicable when there is a violation of the prompt
presentment rule. Other state courts adopting an exclusionary rule
for statements obtained during an impermissible pre-arraignment
delay have applied the fruit of the poisonous tree principle. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, has held inadmissible
identifications resulting from line-ups conducted during an impermissible delay. 117 The court of appeals probably will not exclude all
types of evidence," 8 but it would appear that Maryland courts will
decide on a case by case basis what types of evidence, other than

114. Id. at 330, 384 A.2d at 717.
115. Id. at 327, 384 A.2d at 716 (citing Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 393, 290
A.2d 417, 419 (1972)).

116. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun the Supreme Court held that a confession is
inadmissible if it was obtained immediately after an unlawful entry and
subsequent unauthorized arrest of the defendant. The Court also stated that if
such a confession led to other evidence, it would be inadmissible because it was
the result of an illegal act. The Court did state, however, that if the relationship
between the illegal search and evidence discovered is "so attentuated as to
dissipate the taint," the evidence will not be considered as "fruit of the illegal
search." Id. at 491.
Maryland courts refused to apply the doctrine of Wong Sun, which was a
federal prosecution, for over ten years. The court of appeals finally adopted it in
Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 337 A.2d 100 (1975), rev'g 20 Md. App. 71, 315
A.2d 80 (1974). For a discussion of Wong Sun in Maryland, see Ryon v. State, 29
Md. App. 62, 73-74 n.13, 349 A.2d 393, 401-02 n.13 (1975).
117. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 395, 290 A.2d 417, 420 (1972). Accord,
People v. Williams, 68 Cal. App. 3d 36, 45, 137 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1977).
118. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scrapings from defendant's fingernails
taken after the defendant started to destroy such evidence upon realizing he was
under arrest for strangling his wife, ruled admissible).
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statements or confessions, will be excluded because of a violation of
M.D.R. 723(a). 119
In summary, the Johnson decision adopted an exclusionary rule
for statements and evidence obtained in violation of M.D.R. 723(a).
Although similar to the McNabb-Mallory rule, Maryland's rule not
only demands exclusion of statements obtained during an unnecessary delay, but also it places a maximum limit on the time an
accused can be detained without being presented before a magistrate, regardless of the necessity of the delay. Maryland's rule
therefore commands stricter compliance than Rule 5(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as construed under Upshaw
and Mallory.
D. The Miranda Waiver
The state's final contention was that by thrice waiving his
Miranda rights, Johnson also waived his right to prompt present
ment. 120 This proposition was based upon the belief that Miranda
and prompt presentment share a common purpose. 12 1 The court of
appeals rejected the state's argument and correctly pointed out that
this was not the case.1 22 The court stated that while prompt
presentment does overlap with Miranda, inasmuch as both are
intended to assure that an arrestee is advised of his rights to counsel
and to remain silent, prompt presentment serves additional
functions. 123 For instance, prompt presentment provides a follow-up
warning to a defendant of his constitutional rights by a neutral
judicial officer. 124 Thus, a waiver of Miranda rights does not effect
the state's duty to arraign a defendant in compliance with M.D.R.
723(a). The court of appeals did state, however, that like the fifth
amendment privilege, a defendant can waive his right to prompt
25
presentment.1
119. There was no indication by the court of appeals that statements or confessions

120.
121.
122.

123.
124.
125.

obtained in violation of prompt presentment could not be used for impeachment
purposes. The use of tainted evidence for impeachment purposes was sanctioned
in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) and reaffirmed in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) and Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S 714 (1975). See generally
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J. 1198 (1971);
Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: The Rule of
Harris v. New York, WASH. U.L.Q. 441 (1971).
282 Md. 314, 330-31, 384 A.2d 709, 718 (1978).
The prosecution has successfully employed this argument in the past. See, e.g.,
Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1058 (1970).
Moreover, the Supreme Court indicated in its Miranda decision that a Miranda
warning by the police does not supplant prompt presentment. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 n.32 (1966).
282 Md. 314, 331-32, 384 A.2d 709, 719 (1978). Accord, United States v. Erving,
388 F. Supp. 1011, 1020-21 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
See notes 18-30 and accompanying text supra.
282 Md. 314, 332, 384 A.2d 709, 719 (1978).
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The court did not state exactly how long a defendant may be
held if he waives his right to prompt presentment. It would seem
that when one is arrested without a warrant, the police would still be
bound by the ruling in Gerstein v. Pugh,'26 which requires a judicial
determination of probable cause "as a condition for any significant
127
pretrial restraint of Liberty."'
VI. THE REMEDY
The exclusionary rule is usually applied to suppress evidence
garnered in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. It has
been used in cases of search and seizure that violate the fourth
amendment, 28 for confessions obtained in violation of the fifth
amendment,' 29 for confessions and incriminating evidence obtained
in violation of the sixth amendment', 3 and in cases in which
evidence was obtained by shocking methods.' 3' It also has been
applied by legislative mandate for violations of the wiretapping
law. 132
Two theories have been propounded in support of the exclusionary rule - deterrence of future police misconduct' 33 and preservation
of judicial integrity.' 34 The deterrence theory is based upon the
notion that the only effective way to compel respect for constitutional rights is to remove the incentive to disregard them. 135 Thus,
according to the theory, if the police know that illegally seized
evidence will not be used, they will respect the law.
The second theory, concerned with maintenance of judicial
integrity, seeks to avert a partnership between the police and the
courts in official lawlessness.' 36 In essence, this theory seeks to

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.
134.
135.
136.

420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Id. at 125.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line-ups); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967) (identifications); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(confessions).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the defendant had his
stomach pumped by the police without his consent.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976). See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378
(1968) (excluding evidence obtained in violation of the wiretap law). In
Maryland, the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Maryland wiretap law
is prohibited by MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-405 (Supp. 1978).
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
446-47 (1974). In Tucker, however, the Court noted that where official action is
pursued in good faith, the deterrence rationale loses force. Id. at 447.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48485 (1928) ( Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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prevent the courts from becoming part of an illegal process. 13 7 Its
proponents assert that the taint of illegality on the judicial process
will be eliminated if courts exclude illegally obtained evidence. It has
also been stated that courts' acceptance of such evidence could result
in undesirable consequences. "If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
' 3
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. '
The Supreme Court has accepted the deterrence theory as the
basis for the exclusionary rule. 39 Although the Supreme Court's
rationale for the exclusionary rule was not binding on the Johnson
court, the court of appeals seems to have adopted it. Because
deterrence was the primary purpose for the court's ruling it probably
will not be retroactive, 14 0 as Chief Judge Murphy feared in his
dissent. 4' There is no deterrent effect in a retroactive application of
a rule.

VII.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Johnson decision will have considerable
impact on the administration of criminal justice in Maryland. Prearraignment statements will be admissible only if given spontane-

137. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Chief Justice Warren observed that "[clourts
which sit under our Constituation cannot and will not be made party to lawless
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions." Id. at 13.
138. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In
Olmstead, Justice Holmes in his dissent added:
[W]e must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot
have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that
criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence
should be used. It also is desirable that the Government should not itself
foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained. . . . We have to choose, and for my part I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part."
Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See generally Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970).
140. For a discussion on applying a ruling retroactively, see Robinson v. Neil, 409
U.S. 505, 507-11 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627-29, 640 (1965) (discussing whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), should be applied retroactively).
141. 282 Md. 314, 350, 384 A.2d 709, 729 (1978) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). The court of
special appeals was recently confronted with a Johnson retroactivity problem in
Shope v. State, 41 Md. App. 161, 396 A.2d 282 (1979). The court of special appeals,
however, stated that the case had not been finally decided and thus did not rule
on the issue of retroactivity. Finally decided, according to the court of special
appeals, meant that all appeals had been exhausted and "the time for petition of
certiorari had elapsed." Id. at 168, 396 A.2d at 287 (citing Linkletter v. Walker,
318 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)). Since Johnson was decided on the same day that
Shope was sentenced, the court of special appeals felt compelled to apply the
Johnson per se sanction to the violation of M.D.R. 723(a) in Shope. Id. at 169, 396
A.2d at 287.
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ously after arrest, 14 2 pursuant to a waiver of one's prompt
arraignment right, and finally, during a necessary delay of no
longer than the earlier of 24 hours or the first session of court after
arrest. The decision shall require greater police efforts in order to
avoid the exclusion of evidence obtained before a defendant is presented to a magistrate.
Johnson resulted in the court of appeals applying a drastic
remedy, the exclusionary rule, to the violation of a nonconstitutional right. When a statutory right is so closely akin to a
constitutional right, as is prompt presentment, the two become
inextricably interwoven. Accordingly, the rule deserves the same
remedy for its violation as violations of the constitutional rights it
protects: total exclusion from the trier of fact.
Finally, just as the federal courts never really embraced the
McNabb-Mallory rule, 143 the court of appeals probably will be faced
with numerous cases in which the Maryland trial courts will
have tried to circumvent or modify the Johnson decision. Moreover,
Johnson was a 4-3 decision and its author, Judge Levine, is now
deceased. It therefore remains to be seen how the court of appeals'
newest member, Judge Rita Davidson, will decide cases brought
under the Johnson ruling.
In addition, the Maryland General Assembly may modify or
abrogate the Johnson court's ruling. During the 1979 legislative
session' an emergency bill that would have reinstated the voluntariness test for statements obtained in violation of Rule 723(a) passed
the House of Delegates, but was tabled by the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee. 144 Future legislative proposals to modify the
rule would therefore seem eminent. Thus, the ultimate viability of
Johnson is as yet undetermined.
John E. Betts

142. There must be detention after an arrest or M.D.R. 723(a) will not be applicable.
Relying on United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951), the court of special
appeals recently ruled that if a defendant is already serving a sentence for an
unrelated crime, the provisions of M.D.R. 723(a) do not apply. Chaney v. State, 42
Md. App. 563, 568-71, 402 A.2d 86, 90-91 (1979).
143. The federal courts applied the sanctions of McNabb-Mallory infrequently. The
courts ultimately reduced the admissibility determination to a voluntariness
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 885 (1967); United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961).
144. H.B. 309 (January 22, 1979). The bill, which would have amended MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-912 (Supp. 1978) stated:
A confession will not be excluded from evidence solely because the
defendant was not taken before a judicial officer within any specified
time. Failure to strictly comply with the provisions of the Maryland
District Rules pertaining to taking a defendant before a judicial officer
after arrest is only one factor, among others, to be considered by the
court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.

